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11. Introduction
A bank’s opportunity to hide loan losses has played an important part in recent banking crises, most
of all in emerging economies. This can be confirmed by abundant evidence. To begin, De Juan
(1996, p. 91) describes the methods of hiding as follows
“..when a loan – particularly a large loan – becomes questionable or bad because of the borrower’s lack
of repayment capacity, the bank rolls over the loan so that it does become past due. Alternatively, the
borrower may be given a new loan to repay the previous loan. The rolled-over loan does not become
past due in the books and the new loan is not in arrears, but the actual debt is”
The hiding methods – a bank rolls over the defaulted loans or refinances them with subsequent
loans - are so effective that a bank may seem to be greatly profitable even when it possesses a large
burden of hidden problem loans and is de facto insolvent. These types of occurrences are
documented by numerous researchers.
“Yet, during the previous banking crises, many of Latin America’s banking systems have reported
positive net income to assets, whereas banking systems in industrial countries have reported significant
negative net income to assets. Rojas-Suarez & Weissbrod (1996, p. 13).”
Improvements in accounting and transparency, a bank run, a banking crisis or an accurate bank
audit finally reveals the bank’s true financial condition. In Baltic States, for instance, this is reported
by Hansson &  Tombak (1999, p.217)
“The ability of banks to roll over problem loans concealed their true solvency and created a false
picture of health. Bank profits and thus net worth were overstated. When the hidden problems finally
emerged, especially through improved accounting and auditing, the resulting erosion of profits and
2capital was unexpected. When large, these changes could transform a seemingly solvent bank into an
apparently insolvent one.”
Since a bank is often capable of hiding loan losses for a long time, they accumulate with time and
the magnitude of the surfacing loan losses may eventually be massive. In Argentina, for example,
the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans was over 30% in 1986 and in Uruguay it was almost
46%. Even more dramatic, in Bulgaria, the ratio was over 60%. The ratios are much larger than in
the industrialized countries where transparency is relatively good and bank regulators close down or
recapitalize insolvent banks. In sharp contrast to emerging economies, during the savings and loan
crisis in the U.S.A, ratio of non-performing loans to total loans reached a peak value, 4.1%, in 1987
(Sheng, 1996a).  For more evidence on hidden loan losses and banking crises see Kanya & Woo
(2001), Gunther & Moore (2003) and Peek & Rosengren (2005).
Given the high frequency of recent banking crises, the crucial role of their hidden loan
losses and the complexity of the hiding methods, it is important to investigate hiding in detail. Few
researchers have investigated banking under hidden loan losses: e.g. Aghion & Bolton & Fries
(1999), Freixas (1999), Corbett & Mitchell (2000), Mitchell (2000, 2001) and Repullo (2004b).
With full agreement with the significance of their contributions, the hiding process is not explored
in detail, since they focus on optimal bailout policies. The paper aims to fulfil this gap in the
literature by investigating alternative methods to hide loan losses. Do banks’ loan interest income
and payments on deposits vary under alternative methods? What is the most profitable hiding
method? Does an opportunity to hide loan losses worsen the moral hazard problem? How can a
regulator eliminate this type of moral hazard? Do alternative methods of hiding require different
instruments from the regulator? The paper explores those two methods of hiding which are
documented in the literature: the rolling over method (a bank extends the maturity of a problem loan
and capitalizes unpaid interest in the loan) and the refinancing method (a bank grants a subsequent
loan to a borrower who cannot repay his original loan. The loan capital of the subsequent loan is
3used to repay the original loan). In addition, the paper introduces the third method to hide loan
losses: a compensating balance method. A bank grants an oversize loan to a borrower, who must
maintain a part of it in his bank account (=a compensating balance) but the borrower can invest the
rest of the loan capital in a project.  Since the loan repayments are paid at the beginning from the
compensating balance account, each borrower can then service his loan whether or not his
investment project is successful. Therefore, at the beginning the bank bears no loan losses and it
generates handsome profits. Finally, the true condition of the financed projects and of the bank
surfaces.
The results indicate that the rolling over method is the least profitable alternative to
hide loan losses. A defaulted loan incurs no losses to a bank (the lost loan capital is not deducted
from the bank’s income and bank capital) but it yields no repayments either. The refinancing
method proves to be as profitable as the compensating balance method; a defaulted loan incurs no
losses to the bank and it yields repayments. Both methods represent a Ponzi scheme.  If the share of
defaulted loans is large, the bank may be illiquid under the rolling over method, since the defaulted
loans yield no loan interest income. The illiquidity reveals the hidden loan losses to outsiders. The
regulator may be able to mitigate the profitability of the rolling over method by forcing banks to
diversify their lending or by excluding unpaid loan interest from retained earnings and thereby from
bank capital. Yet, the regulator’s main instrument against hiding proves to be auditing.
Since the paper explores moral hazard under an opportunity to hide loan losses, it is
related to rich research on moral hazard in banking: e.g. Merton (1977), Matutes & Vives (1996,
2000), Blum (1999, 2002), Chiesa (2001), Decamps & Rochet & Roger (2004), Freixas & Rochet
& Parigi (2004) and Repullo (2004a).1 The paper differs from these articles because it investigates
how hiding affects moral hazard. In addition, the paper extends fresh research on Ponzi schemes,
e.g. Bhattacharya (2003) and Araujo &  Pasoa & Torres-Martinez (2002).
1 For an extensive survey regarding this literature, see Freixas & Rochet (1997).
4The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a model, whereas Section 3 is
devoted to banking with monitoring. Banking without monitoring is examined in Section 4, while
Section 5 characterizes diversification and Ponzi schemes. The compensating balance method is
studied in Section 6, Section 7 analyses bank supervision and Section 8 concludes.
2.  Economy
The model includes entrepreneurs (=borrowers), banks and a bank regulator. Everyone is risk
neutral and the banking sector is fully competitive. The model has two periods: period-1 and period-
2. Period-1 begins at time point 0 and ends at time point 1. Period-2 begins at time point 1 and ends
at time point 2.
2.1 Project types
The total amount of entrepreneurs is 1 in both periods. At the beginning of period-1, each
entrepreneur can undertake an investment project. When the project is started, its upcoming type is
uncertain. The realized project type is learned during period-1 after the investment. Three
alternative project types exist.
A fast project lasts for a period. If successful, it produces Y units of output at the end of the
period-1.
A  slow project lasts for two periods. It produces no interim output at the end of period-1. If
successful, it produces 2Y  at the end of period-2,
2
2 YY ? . The liquidation value of the slow project
is zero at the end of period-1.
A failed project has no value and the failure is irreversible.
5If an entrepreneur exerts effort to his project, the project represents a good project variety and it
succeeds with certainty. A good project becomes later either the fast project or the slow project.
Without effort, a bad project comes true and the project succeeds with probability 10, ?? pp ,
in each period and fails with probability p?1  . A bad project becomes later the fast project, the
slow project or a failed project.
An investment project requires a unit of capital input. An entrepreneur now has capital
of his own and he needs to seek for a bank loan. Since the upcoming project type is unknown when
the bank grants a loan, the bank lends the funds for a period at the gross loan interest rate iR?1 ,
? ?nmmi RRR ,? . mrRm ??  denotes the breakeven loan interest rate with bank monitoring while
rRnm ?  represents the loan interest rate without monitoring. Here r  is the interest rate of the
economy, which is the cost of bank deposits and bank capital, whereas m  denotes the non-
monetary costs of monitoring. If the financed project proves to belong to the slow type, it yields no
output at the end of period-1. Since the slow project has a small liquidation value, 0 , but very large
long-term output at the end of period-2, 2Y , it is optimal to reschedule the loan repayments. At the
beginning of period-1, the bank commits to reschedule the original loan at the fixed loan interest
rate, if the financed project proves to be slow. Two alternative methods for rescheduling exist.
Rolling over: The original loan is rolled over and its extent is iR?1  during period-2 because unpaid
interest is capitalized in the loan.  During period-2, the loan interest rate is again iR .  If the project
succeeds, the bank receives 2)1( iR?  at the end of period-2.
Refinance: At the end of period-1, the bank grants a new short-term loan (= a subsequent loan) to a
borrower with a slow project. The extent of the subsequent loan is iR?1  and its interest rate is iR .
6The borrower repays the original loan, iR?1 , at the end of period-1 using the funds of the
subsequent loan. The repayment of the subsequent loan, 2)1( iR? , takes place at the end of period-2.
More precisely, during period-1 an entrepreneur and his bank recognize the realized project type.
The realized type is private information and unobservable to outsiders (even if the project output is
assumed to be publicly observable). The bank reschedules the loan if the financed project proves to
be slow. In this way, the interruption of the productive long-term project can be prevented.
A standard effort aversion problem is now constructed. A project has positive NPV
only with effort. Yet, given the limited liability of debt finance and the non-monetary costs of
effort, e , an entrepreneur will shirk effort exertion without bank monitoring. Effort aversion can be
eliminated only through monitoring, which incurs non-monetary costs, m , to a bank. The effort
aversion problem is detailed as follows.
Assumption 1. With effort, the NPV of the each upcoming project type is clearly positive.
AmerYi ????? 1.) , 22). YYii ? .
The first inequality states that the NPV of the fast project is clearly positive with effort; the output
covers the repayment of the principal and interest, r?1 ,  the costs of effort exertion, e , the costs of
monitoring, m  and the cost of bank auditing. A   denotes the highest auditing cost of the bank
regulator and is defined later. The second inequality displays that the slow project is even more
productive than the fast project and thus its NPV is positive.
Assumption 2. Without effort, the NPV of each project type is negative.
7rpYi ?? 1.) , rpYii ?? 1). 2 .
According to the first inequality, the NPV of the fast project is negative without effort. The second
equality expresses the same results for the slow project, when the project has matured for a period.
This ensures that the NPV of the slow project is negative, when the project is started.
Assumption 3. In the absence of monitoring, an entrepreneur shirks effort.
? ? erYrYpi ?????? )1()1(.) ,
? ? erYrYpii ?????? )1()1(.) 22 ,
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?erYerYrYprYpiii ??????????????? )1()1()1()1()1()1(.) 222 ?????? .
The first inequality states that an entrepreneur shirks effort if he faces the fast project. The
entrepreneur shirks effort also during the second period of the slow project. This is shown by the
second inequality. As to the third inequality, it implies that the entrepreneur shirks effort at the
beginning of the period-1, when the upcoming type of the project is still unknown, but it will be fast
with probability ?  and slow with probability ??1 .
Consequently, the effort aversion problem appears and it can be eliminated only by
monitoring borrowers. The task of monitoring is delegated to banks, which charge breakeven
interest, mrRm ??  , on loans. This does not, however, ensure that the banks monitor their
borrowers. Given the limited liability of banks, they may neglect costly monitoring. A bank
8monitors only if monitoring is at least as profitable as the non-monitoring strategy. This moral
hazard problem is investigated in later sections.2
2.2 Bank’s balance sheet
In period-1 the volume of new projects is 1. The bank finances the projects and funds its operations
with the fixed amount of equity capital, E , and deposits. As mentioned before, the interest rate of
the economy, r , represents the cost of capital and deposits.
With monitoring, a stochastic share s  of financed projects proves to be slow. Here s
has a support ? ?SS , , 10 ??? SS , continuous density g , and distribution G . The rest of the
financed projects, s?1 , are fast. Without monitoring, a stochastic share l  of financed projects fails.
Here l  has a support ? ?LL, , 10 ??? LL , continuous density f , and distribution F . Regarding
the rest of the assets, l?1 , a stochastic share s  of those will be slow and the rest s?1  will be fast.
Thus, the volumes of financed projects are: l  failed projects, sl)1( ?  slow projects and )1)(1( sl ??
fast projects.
Since a few projects are fast and mature at the end of period-1, the bank’s loan
portfolio has room for fresh loans at the beginning of period-2. These funds are invested in fresh
projects which are known to be fast and which mature at the end of period-2.
To clarify connections between symbols, it is useful to note that under shirking a
project’s expected probability to success meets
? ??
L
L
dllflp )()1( .                  (2.1)
2 The following values, for example, satisfy Assumptions 1-3: 75.0,03.0,08.0,02.0 ???? pmer
.8.0,01.0,33.1,15.1 2 ???? ?AYY  Hence, it is known that 05.0?mR  .
9Since an average project is unprofitable in the absence of monitoring, loans are on average also
unprofitable without monitoring
? ????
L
L
m rdllfRl 1)()1)(1( .                    (2.2)
Recall that slow projects as well as failed projects yield no output at the end of period-1. In
addition, the shares of both project types are stochastic. Furthermore, the loans that are granted for
these projects can be rescheduled. Since the realized project type is unobservable to outsiders, they
cannot know whether a bank reschedules a loan in order to delay the repayment of a slow project
(which is socially valuable) or to hide a loan loss and thereby applying the non-monitoring strategy
(which is socially harmful). In the bank’s loan portfolio, the share of rescheduling loans is smaller
with monitoring, s  , than without monitoring, sll )1( ?? , since ??? sll )1( ssls ??? )1( .
The bank regulator (= she) insures deposits and audits banks. She pre-commits to
close down banks that neglect monitoring. A closed bank is liquidated and the liquidation proceeds
are first and foremost utilized for payments on deposits. The remainder of the proceeds, if any, is
paid to the banker. The regulatory instruments are used by the regulator in such a way that banks
prefer the monitoring strategy to non-monitoring. Therefore, in equilibrium banks monitor.
The regulator cannot directly observe whether a bank monitors or not. Furthermore, at
the end of period-1 loans cannot be liquidated, since it would interrupt slow projects. This is known
by the banks that attempt to hide their loan losses by rescheduling the defaulted loans. The regulator
aims to reveal hidden loan losses by auditing banks at the end of period-1. With probability h , she
succeeds in revealing a hiding attempt and closes down the bank. The quality of the auditing system
can be chosen by the regulator. When a bank manages to hide its loan losses with probability h  ,
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this incurs costs )1( hA ? to the regulator.3  It is assumed that: ,0)0( ?A
,0)1(' ?? hA AAhAA ???? )1(,0)1('',0)0(' .  Given Assumption 1, banking is profitable even
under the highest quality of auditing, A . The regulator finances the auditing system by taxing
successful entrepreneurs but aims to minimize the costs of auditing subject to the bank’s incentive
constraint.
Even when the regulator cannot uncover a hiding attempt, loan losses surface if their
realized share is so large that the bank is illiquid. The bank is then closed down. In sum, the time
line is the following.
1.1 The regulator imposes an equity capital requirement, E , to banks. Banks are established. Each
bank maintains the same amount, E  , of capital and attracts the amount E?1  of deposits.
1.2 The regulator chooses the quality of the auditing system. The choice is public information.
1.3 Banks grant loans and decide whether or not to monitor.
1.4 Without monitoring, some projects fail.
1.5 The end of period-1: fast projects mature and these loans are repaid. Banks attract deposits for
period-2 and reschedule the loans that are allocated for slow projects. If a bank has neglected
monitoring, it reschedules the defaulted loans. Banks fulfil the rest of their loan portfolio with
fresh short-term loans for fast projects.
1.6 The regulator audits banks. If she observes loan losses, she closes down the bank.
1.7 Banks repay the deposits of period-1. If a bank is illiquid due to a large burden of loan losses,
it cannot repay deposits, the hiding attempt surfaces and the regulator closes down the bank.
Liquid banks repay deposits and the dividends of period-1.
2.0    The entrepreneurs invest the loan capital in the fresh fast projects for period-2.
2.1    The bank decides whether or not to monitor during period-2.
3 Here 1?h  either because the regulator does not audit each bank of the auditing system is imperfect.
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2.2    At the end of period-2, all loans mature and banks are closed down. They repay
         deposits and the banker receives the remaining returns.
Finally, few simplifying assumptions are made.
Assumption 4. If a bank chooses the non-monitoring strategy in period-1, it follows the non-
monitoring strategy also during period-2.
Under some parameter values, the following strategy is possible. A bank neglects monitoring during
period-1 and thereafter observes the realized share of loan losses. If the share of losses is small, the
bank may optimally turn to the monitoring strategy during period-2. This kind of strategy is,
however, unrealistic and thus we have rejected it by making Assumption 4.
Assumption 5. The fixed amount of equity capital satisfies: LE ??0 .
Assumption 5 simplifies the analysis. Furthermore, under some parameter values, it is possible that
the bank neglects monitoring in period-1 and checks the realized share of loan losses. Thereafter,
the banker may optimally reveal loan losses to the regulator although the banker knows that the
regulator closes down the bank. In practise, this strategy is highly unlikely, since liquidation rarely
yields any returns to the bank’s owners. This unrealistic strategy is rejected with Assumption 5.4
4 Liquidation at the end of period-1 can be made unprofitable in several ways. For example, it is possible to assume that
the share of slow projects is always so large that liquidation is unprofitable. We have chosen Assumption 5.
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Assumption 6. Under the non-monitoring strategy, the maximum share of rolled over loans or
refinanced loans satisfies ? ? 1)1()1( ???? mRSLL  and ? ?? ? rERSLL m )1()1(1 ????? .
Assumption 6 ensures that the loan portfolio has enough room to hide loan losses even when the
bank does not grow. That is, the bank’s inability to grow does not reveal the hiding strategy.5 The
second inequality makes it possible to explore the illiquidity of the bank. This option enriches the
analysis.
Assumption 7. Under the rolling over method, ? ?? ? rERSLL m )1()1(1 ????? .
Assumption 7 states that the minimum share of rolled over loans – that is, the total share of loans
that are channelled either for slow projects or for defaulted projects – is so small that a bank can
hide its loan losses by rolling over these loans (the bank is not illiquid with certainty under the
rolling over method). If Assumption 7 is not satisfied, the rolling over method cannot be used to
hide loan losses but the refinance method can be used. This alternative is, of course, possible but not
as interesting.6
5 By denying the growth of the bank, we deny a complex problem whether or not the banker will inject fresh capital in
the bank with hidden loan losses at the beginning of period-2. This problem is already explored in Niinimaki (2007).
6 In addition to footnote 2, suppose that 01.0,4.0,0,45.0,05.0 ????? ESSLL . Then, Assumptions 5-7
are also satisfied.
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3. Monitoring bank
This section sheds light on the operations of a monitoring bank under both rescheduling methods. In
Subsection 3.1 a bank reschedules the loans of slow projects by rolling over these loans. In
Subsection 3.2 the bank refinances these loans. Since the bank has no hidden loan losses, audits by
the regulator have no effect on banking.
3.1 Rolling over
Recall that with monitoring, a stochastic share s  of projects is slow, whereas the rest are fast. At the
end of period-1, a monitoring bank rolls over the loans that are channelled for slow projects. Those
s?1  loans, which are allocated for fast projects, mature yielding loan repayments )1)(1( mRs ?? .
The bank attracts fresh deposits, E?1  , for period-2 and pays back the deposits of period-1,
)1)(1( Er ?? . The banker’s earnings during period-1 – that is, the profit of the bank from which the
cost of monitoring and the cost of injected bank capital are deducted – amounts to
)1()()1()1( rEmdssgrERs m
S
S
??????? . (3.1)
If sˆ  denotes the realized share of the rolled over loans, the banker’s earnings are ??? rRs m)ˆ1(
Em ?   or ERs m ?? ˆ .  Here mRsˆ  represents bank’s interest receivables from the rolled over loans.
The interest receivables belong to the returns from period-1 although they are paid out from the
bank at the end of period-2.  Because the receivables are not paid out at the end of period-1, they
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increase the retained earnings of the bank and thus raise its capital. For the same reason, the need
for deposits for period-2 is mRsE ˆ1 ?? .7
During period-2, the loan portfolio includes the rolled over loans for slow projects,
)1( mRs ? . The rest of the loan portfolio, )1(1 mRs ?? , is reinvested at the beginning of period-2,
since a share s?1  of loans matured at the end of period-1. Thus, the bank can grant )1(1 mRs ??
loans for fresh, fast projects.
At the end of period-2, the loans mature. The loans for slow projects yield 2)1( mRs ? ,
while the loans for fresh fast projects yield ? ? )1()1(1 mm RRs ??? . The loan repayments total mR?1
. After payments on deposits, )1)(1( rsRE m ???  , the banker’s earnings during period-2 amount to
.)()1)(1(1? ??????
S
S
mm mdssgrsRER (3.2)
Given ss ˆ? , this simplifies to )1()1(ˆ rErRs m ??? . The earnings are positive during period-2, but
equal to the present value of the losses from period-1. The life-time earnings from the monitoring
strategy are zero.
3.2 Refinance
Again, at the end of period-1 those s?1  borrowers who face a fast project can repay their loans in
total. The borrowers, who encounter a slow project, have no funds for repayment and the bank
grants a subsequent loan, mR?1 , to each of them. Immediately, the borrowers use the subsequent
loans to repay their original loans. Since each borrower can repay his original loan, the bank obtains
7 The amount of deposits is positive, thanks to Assumptions 5 and 6.
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income mR?1 . It attracts deposits, E?1 , for period-2 and pays back the deposits of period-1,
)1)(1( Er ?? . Hence, the bank profits in period-1 amount to ErmrERm ???? )1( .  If we deduct
the cost of monitoring and the cost of bank capital, Er)1( ? , from Erm ? , we obtain the banker’s
returns E? .
During period-2 the loan portfolio consists of the subsequent loans that are allocated
for slow projects, )1( mRs ? , and of fresh loans, )1(1 mRs ?? , that are channelled at the beginning
of period-2 to fresh fast projects.
At the end of period-2, the fast projects mature, yielding loan repayments
? ? )1()1(1 mm RRs ??? , whereas the subsequent loans yield 2)1( mRs ? . Therefore, the loan
repayments total mR?1 , which is spent to repay interest on  deposits, )1)(1( Er ?? . The bank
enjoys profit )1)(1(1 ErRm ????   or Erm )1( ?? . When the non-monetary costs of monitoring
are subtracted from this, we obtain the banker’s profits during period-2, Er)1( ? . Under the life-
time of the bank, the NPV of the banker’s returns is 0)1( ???? ErE ? .
3.3 Discussion I
It is interesting to note that even though the two methods of rescheduling loan repayments provide
the same returns, 0, to the banker during the life-time of the bank, the banker’s returns differ
between period-1 and period-2. Under the rolling over method the returns are msR  units smaller
than under the refinance method during period-1, but )1( rsRm ?  units larger during period-2.
Importantly, in subsection 3.1 it is implicitly assumed that under the rolling over
method the bank can always pay interest on deposits after period-1, 0)1()1( ???? rERS m . Yet, it
is possible that 0)1()1( ???? rERS m . Then, the bank is illiquid; its loan interest income does not
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cover interest payments on deposits. This is true if the maximum share of slow projects (and
thereby the maximum share of the rolled over loans), S  , is sufficiently high. The problem is
avoided under the refinancing method. Then, each loan is repaid and the bank is liquid.
Under the rolling over method, the illiquidity effect depends crucially on whether or
not the interest receivables can be incorporated into the regulator’s capital requirement, E . To see
this, recall that the unpaid loan interest of the rolled over loans, msR  in all, represents bank’s
interest receivables.  Because the receivables cannot be paid out from the bank at the end of period-
1, they boost the retained earnings of the bank and thus raise its capital. Recall the capital
requirement, E .  Given the retained earnings, the total amount of capital, ?E msR , exceeds the
requirement, E . If the retained earnings can be incorporated into the regulator’s capital
requirement, the bank can release excessive capital, ? ?msREMin , , at the end of period-1. If
? ? mm sRsREMin ?, , the bank’s funds consist of loan interest income, mRs)1( ?  , and released
capital, msR  , mR  in all, which cover interest payments on deposits, rE)1( ? . During period-2 the
capital amounts to E  which consists of retained earnings, msR , and remaining initially injected
capital, msRE ?  . Hence, illiquidity is avoided and the bank obtains in both periods the very same
returns as under the refinance method! If ? ? EsREMin m ?, , the bank’s income totals ERs m ?? )1(  ,
which can be smaller than rE)1( ? . It is possible that the bank is illiquid and fails at the end of
period-1.  To avoid this, the bank can optimally follow the refinance method that avoids the
problem of illiquidity. We will see later that the refinance method represents a Ponzi scheme.
Consequently, it may be socially optimal to obey a Ponzi scheme and thus avoid the failure of the
solvent bank due to temporary illiquidity.  A summary follows.
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Proposition 1. When a bank monitors borrowers and reschedules the loans that are channelled
for the slow projects, both rescheduling methods yield equal returns to the bank during its life-time.
If the retained earnings cannot be incorporated into the regulator’s capital requirement, the
refinance method is more profitable during period-1 but the rolling over method is more profitable
during period-2. If the retained earnings can be incorporated into the regulator’s capital
requirement and if the amount of the rolled over loans is sufficiently small ( ?E msR ), the methods
yield equal returns in both periods.
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4. In the absence of monitoring
This section investigates bank returns in the absence of monitoring when a bank hides its loan
losses either by rolling over defaulted loans (subsection 4.1) or by refinancing failed projects
(subsection 4.2). Thereafter the profitability of the methods is compared in subsection 4.3.
4.1 Rolling over
Consider a representative bank that neglects monitoring during period-1 and a stochastic share 1l  of
loans default (subscript 1 stresses that the realized loan losses stem from period-1).  The expected
bank returns can be found out by aggregating returns under four situations.
With probability h  the bank manages to hide its loan losses and generates during
period-1 expected returns
dssgdllfrERsl m
l
L
s
S
Ro )()()1()1)(1( 11111
11
????? ??? , (4.1)
which can be paid out as dividends to the banker at the end of period-1. Here mRsl )1)(1( 1 ??  marks
the total loan interest income from the fast projects. The bank rolls over 1l  defaulted loans and
sl )1( 1?  loans, which are allocated for slow projects. The outsiders do not observe whether the
loans have been rolled over in order to finance slow projects or to hide loan losses. The second term
rE)1( ?  indicates interest payments on deposits. Only if the loan interest income is adequate to pay
interest on deposits, hiding is possible. In (4.1) 1l  represents the highest possible share of loan
losses which satisfies ??? mRSl )1)(1( 1 rE)1( ?  , where ? ?LLl ,1 ?  (recall that E  is fixed). Thus,
1l  is the highest possible share of loan losses such so the bank is still liquid when the realized share
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of slow projects is at the minimal level, S . We may have Ll ?1 . In addition, )ˆ( 11 ls  denotes the
highest realized share of slow projects so that the bank is liquid, when the realized share of
defaulted loans is given, 1ˆl ,
? ? ? ?SSsrERlsl m ,,0)1()ˆ(1)ˆ1( 1111 ?????? .                      (4.2)
It may be possible that Ss ?1 , if 1ˆl  is sufficiently small. On the other hand, if the constraint (4.2) is
not satisfied even when Ss ?1  then Ss ?1 . The probability that the realized share of slow projects
is so low that the bank is liquid, 11ˆ ss ? , is
? ???
1 1
)()(
s
S
l
L
dsdlsglf . (4.3)
The optimality of hiding compared with the revelation of loan losses is shown in Appendix A.
With probability h?1  the audit reveals hidden loan losses, the regulator closes down
the bank, liquidates it and repays the deposits. The banker receives the rest of the liquidation
proceeds
dssgdllfrERsl m
l
L
s
S
Ro )()()1)(1()1)(1)(1( 11112
1212
??????? ??? ,                      (4.4)
where 12l   is the highest share of loan losses which satisfies )1)(1()1)(1)(1( 12 rERSl m ?????? ,
? ?LLl ,12 ?  . If the constraint is not satisfied even when the realized share of loan losses is at the
minimum level, Ll ?1ˆ , it is known that Ll ?12 . If the constraint is satisfied even when the realized
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share of loan losses exceeds L , that is Ll ?1ˆ , then Ll ?12  .In addition, )ˆ( 1212 ls  is the highest share
of slow projects that satisfies ???? )1)()ˆ(1)(ˆ1( 1212 mRlsl )1)(1( rE ??  when ? ?SSls ,)ˆ( 12 ?  and 12lˆ
is given.
With probability ? ???1h   the audit does not reveal loan losses, but the true financial
condition of the bank surfaces due to illiquidity. The burden of rolled over loans, which yield no
loan interest payments at the end of period-1, is so large that the bank is illiquid; the realized loan
interest income, mRsl )ˆ1)(ˆ1( 1 ?? , is insufficient for the interest on deposits, rE)1( ? . This reveals
the hiding attempt and the bank is closed down. The banker receives the remainder of the
liquidation proceeds
? ?)1)(1()1)(ˆ1)(ˆ1(,0 1 rERslMax m ?????? , (4.5)
where 1ˆl  and sˆ   are the realized shares of loan losses and slow projects. Some manipulation gives
? ? ? ?? ?)1()ˆ1)(ˆ1()1()ˆ1)(ˆ1(,0 11 EslrERslMax m ?????????  . (4.6)
Here the term in the first brackets is negative due to the illiquidity and the term in the second
brackets is negative because the term in the first brackets is negative and rRm ? . Thus, it is known
that ? ? 0.. ?Max . When the loan losses surface due to illiquidity and the bank is closed down, the
banker receives no returns.8
8 De Juan (1996, p. 93) highlights the important signalling effect of illiquidity: “In the mid 1980s, Argentina suffered a
very serious banking crisis that affected mostly new banks and banks run by new bankers. Some two to three hundred
banks experienced interventions and/or were liquidated. Practically all were insolvent, but intervention was triggered by
illiquidity. Only through illiquidity was the insolvency discovered.”
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With probability ?h  the bank manages to hide loan losses during period-1 and
reaches period-2. Then, the loan portfolio includes the rolled over loans. In addition, since a part of
the loans is allocated for fast projects during period-1, these loans mature at the end of period-1 and
the funds can be used to finance fresh, fast projects during period-2. At the end of period-2 the loans
mature. The bank’s expected returns from period-2 are (the ex ante point of view, when the share of
period-1 loan losses has not been realized)
? ? ,)()()()1)(1()1)(1()1(1 2211212
2 11
dllfdssgdllfrRElRlR m
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L
l
L
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Ro
Ro
?????????? ? ???    (4.7)
where sll )1( 11 ???? represents the total amount of the rolled over loans.  Given Assumptions 5
and 6, it known that the amount of deposits is positive, 01 ???? mRE . In addition, )ˆ( 12 ll Ro   is the
highest realized share of loan losses during period-2 so that the bank can repay deposits
? ? 0)1)(1()1)(1(ˆ)1(1 21 ?????????? rRElRlR mRomm , ? ?LLl Ro ,2 ? . (4.8)
If the bank makes a profit even when the realized share of loan losses is at the upper limit, Ll Ro ?2ˆ ,
we have Ll Ro ?2 . On the other hand, if the bank cannot repay deposits even when the realized share
of loan losses is at the lower limit, Ll Ro ?2ˆ  , we have Ll Ro ?2  and 02 ?Ro? . In (4.8) the loan
repayments, ? ? )1)(1()1(1 21 lRlR mm ???? , consist of two parts. The first part includes the loan
repayments from the successful loans that are granted by the bank at the beginning of period-2 for
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fresh fast projects, ? ? )1)(1()1(1 2lRR mm ????? . The second part represents loan repayments from
the loans that were channelled for slow projects, )1()1()1( 2
2
1 lRsl m ??? . 9
The banker’s total earnings from the non-monitoring strategy consist of expected bank
returns from which the costs of injected bank equity are subtracted
ErhhhhE RoRoRoRo )1()1();( 21211 ??????? ???? .                                                   (4.9)
We are implicitly assuming that .0)0;( ?? ERo  The amount of bank capital is so small that the
rolling over strategy yields a profit to the banker if the quality of the auditing system is zero.10
9 Sheng (1996b, p. 151) documents how the rolling over method was used during the Chilean banking crisis at the
beginning of 1980s. “Auditors for Banco Espanol qualified their report for 1979 by stating that 37% of loans could not
be evaluated because of lack of information on the debtors’ ability to pay – even through the loans had been rolled over
repeatedly.”
10 Recall the numeric example in Footnotes 2 and 5. Under these values, it is known that 012 ?
Ro?  .   From (4.2)  it  is
possible to observe that the maximum share of rolled over loans, ? , such that a non-monitoring bank is liquid, is 0.604.
Inserting this to (4.8) indicates that the payments on deposits are at least 0.978. Since the loan repayments are at most
0.95,  the  bank  fails  with  certainty  at  the  end  of  period-2, 02 ?
Ro? . The banker’s expected earnings from the non-
monitoring strategy, (4.9), are Erh RoRo )1(11 ???? ? .  Let us extend the numeric example by assuming that both the
share of defaulted loans and the share of slow projects have a continuous uniform distribution. It is possible to find out
that 012.011 ?
Ro? .   Hence,  it  is  known  that 0102.0012.0* ??? hRo . If 1?h  , the non-monitoring strategy yields
profits 0.0018 and it is the optimal to neglect monitoring.  To make the non-monitoring strategy unprofitable, the
regulator needs to invest in auditing so that 85.0?h or smaller.
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4.3 Refinance
The bank neglects monitoring, learns the realized share of loan losses and the realized share of slow
projects. Each fast project yields repayment, mR?1 units. The bank refinances the failed projects
and slow projects by granting subsequent loans to these borrowers. The subsequent loans are used
to repay the original ones. Consequently, the bank receives loan interest income mR?1 . It attracts
deposits for period-2, E?1 , and repays the deposits of period-1, )1)(1( rE ?? . In period-1, the
bank enjoys profit
rERm )1(
Re
1 ???? ,                                                             (4.10)
which can be paid out to the banker. This represents returns in the case that the hiding attempt is
successful. Since the loan interest income exceeds the payments on deposits, rERm )1( ?? , loan
losses never surface due to the illiquidity, as with the rolling over method.
With probability h?1 , the audit reveals hidden loan losses and the bank is closed.
The returns are the same as with the rolling over method, Ro12? .
With probability h , the bank manages to hide and keeps on operating during period-2.
Then, the loan portfolio includes )1(1 mRl ? subsequent loans, which are used to hide loan losses
and )1()1( 1 mRsl ?? subsequent loans that are allocated for slow projects. The rest of the loan
portfolio, ??? )1(1 1 mRl )1()1( 1 mRsl ?? , consists of short-term loans to finance fresh, fast projects.
At the end of period-2, each project and loan matures. The slow projects yield loan
interest payments )1()1)(1( 2
2
1 lRls m ??? . The loans for fresh, fast projects yield repayments,
? ? )1)(1()1)(1()1(1 211 mmm RlRlsRl ??????? . Given these, the loan interest income
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totals ? ? )1)(1()1(1 21 mm RlRl ???? , whereas payments on deposits amount to )1)(1( rE ?? . The
bank generates expected profits
? ? 221121Re2 )()()1)(1()1)(1()1(1
Re
2
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mm ???????? ? ?? ,                  (4.11)
where )ˆ( 1
Re
2 ll  , ? ?LLl ,Re2 ?  , is the highest share of loan losses during period-2 which satisfies
? ? 0)1)(1()1)(1(ˆ)1(1 Re21 ???????? rElRlR mm .                     (4.12)
Here Ll ?Re2  if the bank can repay deposits with each realized share of loan losses during period-2.
In addition, Ll ?Re2  , if the realized share of loan losses is always so high that the bank cannot pay
back deposits. The banker’s expected returns during its life time total11
Erhhh Ro )1()1( Re212
Re
1
Re ??????? ???? .                    (4.13)
11 Recall the numeric example in Footnotes 2, 6 and 10. Under these values, it is known that 012 ?
Ro?  .  During period-2,
the payments on deposits exceed 1, whereas the loan repayments are less than 0.95. Hence, the bank fails with certainty
and 02 ?
Ro?  . Under the refinance method, the banker’s expected earnings from the non-monitoring strategy simplify to
Erh )1(Re11
Re ???? ?  or 01.003.0* ?h . Suppose that 1?h . It is easy to observe that the refinance method is much
more profitable than the rolling over method, 0018.002.0 ? . To make the refinance method unprofitable, the regulator
needs to invest in auditing so that h is at most 1/3.
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4.3 Discussion II
This subsection explores which method, the rolling over method or the refinance method, is more
profitable to a non-monitoring bank. Two cases are examined depending on whether or not interest
receivables are allowed to be incorporated in the required amount of bank capital. In the first
scenario, this is not possible, but in the second, it is.
By deducting the bank returns under the rolling over method from the bank returns
with refinance, we obtain difference, Ro??? Re , or
? ?Ros
S
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m hdssgdllfRhdssgdllfrERh 2
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)()()()()1( ??? ?????? ? ?? ? .               (4.14)
Here sll )1( 11 ????  represents the total amount of rolled over loans. The difference consists of
three terms in such a way that the first term and the second term describe returns in period-1. The
first, positive term indicates returns from refinancing when the realized share of rolled over loans is
so large that the rolling over method is unprofitable due to the illiquidity. Since the bank is always
liquid under the refinance method, this method yields profits. The second, positive term expresses
the difference in returns when both methods yield profits. The realized share of the rolled over loans
is so small that the bank is liquid also under the rolling over method. Yet, under the refinance
method each loan yields the loan interest income, mR , whereas under the rolling over method only a
share )1)(1( 1 sl ??  of loans yield interest income. Obviously, the refinancing method is more
profitable. The third term in (4.14) shows the difference in expected returns during period-2 and can
be detailed as (recall (4.7) and (4.11))
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Both methods yield an equal loan interest income but the payments on deposits are smaller under
the rolling over method, since unpaid loan interest is capitalized in the loan size. This raises bank
capital and thereby reduces the need for deposits. The effect makes the rolling over method more
profitable than the refinance method during period-2. Yet, the probability that the bank achieves
period-2 is smaller under the rolling over method because illiquidity may reveal hidden loan losses
at the end of period-1. As a result, we do not know which method yields higher expected returns
from period-2. Appendix B shows the difference in expected returns during period-2,
? ?Roh 2Re2 ??? ?  , is larger than
dssgdllfRh m
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?? ?? .                  (4.16)
Hence, it is known that (4.14) is positive; the refinance method is more profitable than the rolling
over method. More precisely, the refinance method is more profitable than the rolling over method
during period-1 while during period-2 the reverse is true. The effect of period-1, however,
dominates for two reasons. To begin, under the rolling over method the bank achieves period-2 only
if it is liquid during period-1. Thus, the bank does not achieve “the relatively high returns of period-
2” with certainty. In addition, during period-2 the hidden loan losses surface. The burden of loan
losses is likely to be so large that the bank fails whether it has rolled over the defaulted loans or
refinanced them. The fact that the bank returns are larger under the rolling over method is
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meaningless when both methods yield negative returns and the banker is protected by limited
liability. A conclusion can be made.
Proposition 2. When interest receivables cannot be incorporated into the regulator’s capital
requirement, the refinancing method is more profitable for a non-monitoring bank than the rolling
over method.
Consider now that the regulator imposes a capital requirement for banks and that interest
receivables, which belong to retained earnings, can be incorporated into the required capital. Thus,
after period-1, bank capital totals mRE ??  . The bank can lower the amount of capital by releasing
excessive capital by ? ?mREMin ?, . This creates two cases.
If ? ? mm RREMin ???, , it is possible to lower capital back to the required level, E .
During period-2 bank capital, E , consists of retained earnings, mR? , and the remaining, initially
injected capital, mRE ?? . Thus, at the end of period-1 the bank can release mR?  units of initially
injected capital and spend these funds to cover interest payments on deposits. These funds, mR? ,
and the loan interest income, mRls )1)(1( 1??  or mRR ?? , together amount to mR , which covers
interest payments on deposits, rE)1( ? . In period-1, the bank generates returns rERm )1( ??   and
in period-2 it makes returns Re2? . In both periods the returns are the same as under the refinance
method!
If ? ? EREMin m ??, , the bank can drop capital to ERm ??  for period-2. Then, bank
capital consists entirely of the retained earnings, mR? , and it exceeds E . The bank can release the
initially injected capital in total and spend these funds to cover interest payments on deposits at the
end of period-1. These released funds, E , and the loan interest income, mm RR ?? , together amount
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to )( ERR mm ??? .  Since ERm ?? , the income is lower during period-1 than under the refinance
method. Hence, during period-1, the refinance method yields larger returns. During period-2, the
rolling over method is more profitable thanks to the larger amount of bank capital, ERm ?? ,  and
thus smaller payments on deposits. Appendix C shows that even when 0??? ERB  is minimal, the
refinance method is more profitable than the rolling over method during the lifetime of the bank.
The intuition is obvious. Since the bank goes into bankruptcy with a positive probability during
period-2, the expected, relatively high returns from the rolling over method during period-2 are
insufficient to cover its relative losses during period-1.
Proposition 3. When interest receivables can be incorporated into the regulator’s capital
requirement, the profitability of the methods depends on the realized amount of rolled over loans,
? .  If ERB ?? ,  the refinance method and the rolling over method yield equal returns for a non-
monitoring bank.  If ERB ??  , it is more profitable to refinance than to roll over loans.
Given Proposition 2 and Proposition 3, the refinancing method is always at least as profitable as the
rolling over method.
Obviously, the regulator should not allow banks to incorporate interest receivables
into the required bank capital, since this option increases the returns from hiding under the rolling
over method. The regulator cannot be sure whether or not the interest receivables are based on
performing loans (slow projects) or on defaulted loans. Suppose that the bank neglects monitoring,
rolls over the defaulted loans and thus obtains interest receivables. If the bank can incorporate the
interest receivables into the required bank capital, the receivables raise the capital and the bank can
pay out excessive capital at the end of period-1. This increases the expected returns from the non-
monitoring strategy. At the end of period-2, the true financial condition of the bank surfaces; a large
share of interest receivables proves to be worthless and the bank is likely to be insolvent.
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5. Diversification and Ponzi
In his seminal article, Diamond (1984) utilizes the weak law of large numbers as well as an
assumption on independent and identically distributed project returns to demonstrate how perfect
diversification within the bank eliminates moral hazard. As the number of financed projects
multiplies without bound, the risk of project returns is eliminated through diversification. Thus, the
bank’s income is fixed and it cannot gamble with deposits.12
In our model, suppose first that a bank has no equity capital and it cannot hide loan
losses. In addition, the bank neglects monitoring and the realized share of loan losses is at the
expected level
? ??
L
L
dllflp )()1( . (5.1)
At the end of period-1, the regulator observes loan losses, closes down the bank and liquidates it.
Given (2.2), the bank cannot repay deposits even if the liquidation value of the slow projects was
one
? ?????????
L
L
mm rdllfRlrRp .0)1()()1)(1()1()1(                       (5.2)
Since the liquidation value of slow projects is, however, zero, the non-monitoring strategy is even
more unprofitable (here the realized share of slow projects is at the minimum level)
12 Diamond (1984) analyzes ex post monitoring, whereas this paper investigates interim monitoring.
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rRSp m ???? 1)1)(1( . (5.3)
Therefore, the moral hazard problem is eliminated when loan losses are observable. Let us again
assume that loan losses can be hidden. The bank rolls over the defaulted loans and manages to hide
the loan losses. At the end of period-1, the successful fast projects yield loan interest income,
mRSp )1( ? , to the bank that pays interest r  on deposits and achieves returns
rRSp m ?? )1( , (5.4)
which can be rewritten as
? ? ? ?SpprRSp m ??????? 1)1()1)(1( . (5.5)
Given (5.3), the term in the first brackets, which expresses bank returns without hiding, is negative.
The term in the second brackets is positive. It indicates the extra returns that a bank can achieve by
hiding its loan losses. If the second term is small, bank returns (5.5), are negative and the non-
monitoring strategy is unprofitable even with hiding. More precisely, we have rRSp m ?? )1( ;
the bank is illiquid. When the second term in (5.5) is sufficiently large, the bank returns (5.5), are
positive. The bank’s chance to hide its loan losses by rolling over the defaulted loans makes the
non-monitoring strategy profitable although the loan portfolio is strongly diversified; that is, the
realized share of loan losses is at the average level. Consequently, the chance to hide loan losses
extends the magnitude of the moral hazard problem.
The positive incentive effect of diversification is based on the principle that loan
losses are deducted from the repayments of successful loans and bank capital. The subtracted
volume is so large under perfect diversification that the non-monitoring strategy is unprofitable.
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This effect eliminates moral hazard also in our setting when loan losses are observable, (5.3). The
effect fades when the bank can hide its loan losses by rolling over defaulted loans. Since no loan
losses officially exist, no losses are subtracted. The extra benefit is represented by p?1  in the
second brackets of (5.5). The existence of slow projects also mitigates the problem of moral hazard
when loan losses are observable (see (5.3)). Since these loans have low liquidation value, their
existence decreases the bank returns when the auditor observes hidden loan losses at the end of
period-1 and closes down the bank. This effect is thus avoided when the bank can hide its loan
losses ( Sp  in the second brackets of (5.5)).
Although the bank can dampen the effects of diversification by rolling over defaulted
loans, diversification still influences the bank returns, because the defaulted loans yield no interest
income. The larger the share of defaulted loans, the smaller the bank returns are. As a result,
improved diversification may make the rolling over method unprofitable. Consider two
distributions. The support of the first distribution is ? ?11 , LL  and the second support is ? ?22 , LL  so
that 1221 LLLL ??? . It is possible that
rRSL m ??? )1)(1( 1 , rRSL m ??? )1)(1( 2 . (5.6)
The bank can hide loan losses only if its loan interest income is based on distribution ? ?11 , LL ,
which is relatively less diversified than ? ?22 , LL . Under distribution ? ?22 , LL  , a hiding attempt
surfaces with certainty due to illiquidity. Thus, the regulator may optimally force banks to diversify
their lending in order to eliminate moral hazard. This positive effect of diversification exists,
however, only when the bank uses the rolling over method in hiding. If the bank adopts the
refinancing method, each loan is repaid at the end of period-1 and diversification has no effect.
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More precisely, the chance to hide loan losses increases bank returns in two ways
compared with the returns without hiding.
i.) Bank returns increase because the lost principals of the defaulted loans are not deducted
from the bank’s loan interest income and bank capital at the end of period-1.
ii.) Bank returns increase because the defaulted loans also yield loan interest income, mR .
Under the rolling over method, only the first effect increases bank returns while under the refinance
method, both effects increase them. Interestingly, the refinancing method represents a Ponzi
scheme. Kane (1989, p. 17) gives the following definition to a Ponzi scheme:
“In a Ponzi scheme, a fund-raising enterprise operates with little or none of the earning assets that a
sound enterprise requires to generate a projected stream of cash flows with which to service lenders and
investors. Instead, the enterprise relies on expanding its liabilities faster than its interest and dividend
payments expand. The enterprise pays interest or dividends each period to its old clients- not from
earnings but from funds that are provided by new lenders and investors. As long as new funds can be
attracted into the scheme fast enough, the enterprise’s managers can get corporate obligations as they
come due and pay themselves handsomely at the same time.”
Consider the refinance method. A borrower with a failed project cannot repay his original loan. The
bank grants a subsequent loan to him and he uses the loan capital to repay the original loan. Hence,
the bank’s loan interest income from the original loan, mR , is paid using the capital of the
subsequent loan, which is funded with deposits. Hence, the bank uses, de facto, deposits to pay
interest on its original loans. The loan repayments are not based on project output but on the funds
that are provided by depositors. Since each loan is repaid, the bank generates high loan interest
income, can pay interest on deposits and pay out dividends. This can be summarized as follows.
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Proposition 4. Even when diversification eliminates moral hazard under symmetric information,
it does not eliminate moral hazard with certainty when banks can hide their loan losses.
Diversification can make hiding unprofitable, if the bank hides the loan losses by rolling over these
loans, but diversification has no effect on bank returns if the bank hides the loan losses by
refinancing these loans. Under the refinance method, a bank is running a Ponzi scheme.
Recall from Section 3 that refinancing – and thus a Ponzi scheme – may be socially optimal. Even
with monitoring, the share of slow projects may be so large that the loan interest income does not
cover interest payments on deposits. The bank is illiquid in the short run (during period-1) but
solvent in the long run (during period-2) and it goes into a bankruptcy due to illiquidity. If the bank
is allowed to refinance the slow projects of its borrowers, it can pay interest on deposit and it avoids
bankruptcy. As the matter of fact, the bank is creating liquidity through refinancing because it can
issue liquid demand deposits and pay interest on them even though a major share of its funds is tied
in loans that yield no loan interest income during period-1.
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6. Compensating balances
Until now we have investigated two methods to hide loan losses: the refinance method and the
rolling over method. This section introduces the third method of hiding: compensating balances.
Mishkin (2004, p. 219) defines compensating balances as follows:
“A firm receiving a loan must keep a required minimum amount of funds in a checking account at the bank.
For example, a business getting a $10 million loan may be required to keep compensating balances of at
least $1 million in its checking account at the bank. This $1 million in compensating balances can then be
taken by the bank to make up some of the losses on the loan if the borrower defaults. Besides serving as
collateral, compensating balances help increase the likelihood that a loan will be paid off.”
A bank constructs the following arrangement. It grants loans at the beginning of period-1. Each loan
consists of two parts. The size of the primary loan is 1 unit, and the bank charges interest mR  on it.
The size of the secondary loan is mR  . For as long as an entrepreneur keeps the secondary loan in
his checking account at the bank, the loan interest rate is zero, since the bank can reinvest these
funds in government bonds at the risk free interest rate of the economy.13 When the entrepreneur
withdraws the secondary loan from the bank account, the interest rate is mR . At the end of period-1,
each borrower uses his compensating balance to repay the interest of the primary loan, mR . Hence,
borrowers have no funds in their compensating balance accounts after period-1.
 An entrepreneur, who encounters a slow project, cannot repay his loan in all at the
end of period-1. Thus, these loans are rolled over. Since each borrower can now pay loan interest,
mR , at the end of period-1, the rolling over method is different than in Section 3.
13 Since the funds are invested in risk-free government bonds, which have 0% risk weighting in Basel II, the secondary
loans create no capital requirement.
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Rolling over 2.  The bank can roll over the primary loans and the secondary loans at the end of
period-1. Since the loan interest of period-1 is now paid by each borrower, it is not capitalized in the
loan size. During period-2 borrowers pay interest mR  on their loans. That is, at the end of period-2,
the repayment of the primary loan is mR?1  and the repayment of the additional loan is )1( mm RR ? ,
2)1( mR?  in all.
In the next subsections we first explore banking with monitoring. Thereafter, banking without
monitoring is examined.
6.1 A monitoring bank
During period-1 an entrepreneur learns the realized type of his project: slow or fast. In both cases,
he uses his compensating balance to pay the interest of the primary loan, mR , at the end of period-1.
Since the secondary loan is kept in the checking account during period-1, its loan interest rate is
zero. An entrepreneur, who has faced a fast project, spends the project output, Y , to repay the
principal of the primary loan and the secondary loan, mR?1  in all. Thereafter, he has got out of his
debts. An entrepreneur, who has faced a slow project, pays the loan interest of period-1, mR , using
his compensating balances. Thereafter, the loans are rolled over. Thus, the entrepreneur still
owes the principal of the primary loan and the secondary loan. Since each loan yields the loan
interest income to the bank and since the interest payments on deposits amount rE)1( ? , the bank
generates in period-1 returns
rERm )1( ?? . (6.1)
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During period-2, the loan portfolio includes )1( mRs ?  rolled over loans (the primary loans and the
secondary loans). The rest of the loan portfolio, )1(1 mRs ?? , is used for fresh, fast projects.
At the end of period-2, the slow projects mature. A borrower repays the primary loan,
mR?1  units (the principal and the loan interest of period-2), and the secondary loan, )1( mm RR ?
units (the principal and the loan interest of period-2), 2)1( mR?  in all. The repayments from slow
projects add up to 2)1( mRs ?  . Fresh loans, which were granted at the beginning of period-2, also
mature yielding ? ? )1()1(1 mm RRs ??? . The loan interest income totals mR?1 , while payments on
deposits amount to )1)(1( rE ?? . Hence, in period-2 the bank generates returns
ErERm ??? )1( . (6.2)
Given the cost of monitoring and the costs of injected equity capital, the banker’s profit is zero
during the life-time of the bank.
6.2 Non-monitoring bank
During period-1 an entrepreneur learns the type of his project: slow, fast or defaulted. Independent
of the realized project type, he uses his compensating balance to pay interest on the loan. An
entrepreneur who has faced a fast project also repays his primary loan and the secondary loan in all.
An entrepreneur who has encountered a slow project or a defaulted project lets the bank to roll over
both loans. Since each borrower is able to repay the loan interest at the end of period-1, the loan
interest income amounts to mR  . Given interest on deposits, rE)1( ? , bank returns during period-1
are rERm )1( ?? .
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During period-2, the loan portfolio includes both fresh short-term loans and rolled
over loans. The amount of rolled over primary loans is sll )1( 11 ??  while the rolled over secondary
loans amount to ? ? mRsll )1( 11 ?? , ? ? )1()1( 11 mRsll ???  in all. The rest of the loan portfolio,
? ? )1()1(1 11 mRsll ???? , which is positive, is filled with fresh, short-term loans for fast projects.
After period-2, the loans mature. The rolled over primary and secondary loans yield
)1()1()1( 2
2
1 lRsl m ??? . The fast projects yield ? ?? ? )1)(1()1()1(1 211 mm RlRsll ?????? .  Hence,
the loan repayments total ? ? )1)(1()1(1 21 mm RlRl ???? , while payments on deposits amount to
)1)(1( rE ?? . Therefore, the bank generates during period-2 expected returns
? ? 221121 )()()1)(1()1)(1()1(1
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dllfdllfrElRlR
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L
L
L
mm ???????? ? . (6.3)
A conclusion follows.
Proposition 5. Under the compensating balance method, the bank generates in both periods the
very same returns than under the refinancing method independent of its decision to monitor or
neglect monitoring.
Consequently, the magnitude of the moral hazard problem is the same under both methods. The
bank is again running a Ponzi scheme. The loan interest payments of period-1 are paid using the
funds of the compensating balance accounts. These accounts are funded with the secondary loans,
which are funded with deposits. Thus, the loan interest payments of the failed projects and slow
projects are funded with deposits. The bank is, de facto, using its own deposits to pay loan interest
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to itself. In addition, since the bank rolls over the defaulted loans, the lost principal is not subtracted
from the bank’s income or its capital.
Why is the compensating balance method worth studying? It may be argued that a
hiding attempt can be easily observed by auditing the growth of borrowing; loans to an insolvent
borrower accumulate period after period. This is true under the rolling over method and under the
refinance method. Yet, it is false under the compensating balance method. During period-1, the
bank lends mR?1  units to each borrower. During period-2 a borrower with a failed project has the
same amount of loans. Consequently, the regulator cannot reveal hidden loan losses by focusing on
borrowers with accumulating amounts of debt.
7. Incentive compatible quality of auditing
The regulator earns zero returns. Since the non-monitoring strategy is unproductive, the regulator
operates so that banks optimally monitor.
Given the fixed bank capital, the regulator chooses such a quality of auditing that the
banks are indifferent between the monitoring and non-monitoring strategies. Since the monitoring
strategy yields zero returns, the bank optimally monitors if the expected returns from the non-
monitoring strategy are zero or negative. The expected returns from the non-monitoring strategy are
highest under the refinance method and under the compensating balance method. It is necessary to
choose such a quality of auditing that the expected bank returns are zero under these methods
0)1()1( Re212
Re
1 ?????? Erhhh Ro ???? ,
or
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? ? ? ? 0)1()1()1( 12Re2Re1 ???????? ErhErh Ro???? . (7.1)
The term in the first brackets is larger than the term in the latter brackets. The amount of capital
must be so large that the term in the second brackets is negative. Thereafter, it is easy to see that
when h  is small enough, the bank optimally monitors. Since the good projects are profitable under
the maximum quality (and maximum cost) of auditing, A , there exist always such a quality of
auditing, AA ?* , that makes the non-monitoring strategy unprofitable. Thus, it is possible to
finance the auditing system by taxing firms.
8. Conclusions
This paper challenges the classic arguments, which are initially based on Diamond (1984), that
perfect diversification of loan returns eliminates the moral hazard problem in banking. The paper
shows that when a loan is repaid gradually over several periods and when a bank can hide its loan
losses, perfect diversification does not eliminate moral hazard. Consequently, the paper is very
sceptical as to the depositors’ ability to control banks. Even when a bank seems to enjoy handsome
profits and its balance sheet seems to be in an excellent financial condition, the bank may be de
facto insolvent and operating under a large burden of hidden loan losses.
This paper illustrates three methods of hiding. A bank can hide its loan losses by
rolling over these loans, by refinancing them with subsequent loans that are spent to repay the
defaulted original ones, or by utilizing compensating balances. The profitability of the rolling over
method is smaller (or equal) than the profitability of the other methods. Its profitability increases if
loan interest receivables can be in incorporated in capital requirement, and decreases, if the
regulator can force banks to diversify their lending in such a way that a non-monitoring bank is
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always illiquid. The compensating balance method is as profitable as the refinancing method. Both
methods represent a Ponzi scheme. The paper fails to explain why banks so commonly adopt the
rolling over method even though it is not the most profitable one.
How can bank regulators eliminate hiding? A key problem is that it may sometimes be
socially optimal to reschedule loan repayments when a financed project is profitable in a long run,
but cannot yield loan repayments in the short run. Section 3 indicates that a bank may sometimes
optimally run a Ponzi scheme. Without it the bank may fail due to illiquidity although it is solvent
in the long run. It is difficult to evaluate how common this type of problem is in reality.
In the model framework, hiding can be mitigated simply by reducing the dividend
payouts of a bank after period-1 if the bank possesses numerous of rescheduled loans. This
instrument is, however, a bit unrealistic. In practise, banks have long-term lending relationships,
which include sequential loans that are based on the stochastic needs of borrowers. It is not possible
to reduce the dividend payouts of each bank with long-term lending relationships.
Careful bank auditing may provide the one and only effective instrument against
hidden loan losses. The regulators need to audit not only the financial condition of a bank but also
the financial condition of its borrowers. This is a demanding task.
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Appendix A
Appendix A determines that a bank rather intends to hide its loan losses by rolling over these loans
than reveal them to the regulator. When the bank makes this decision, it already knows the realized
shares of loan losses and slow projects in period-1. By hiding loan losses the bank makes profits
rERsl m )1()ˆ1)(ˆ1( 1 ???? ,                     (A.1)
in period-1 and expected profit
? ? ? ? dllfrRslRlElRlR mmmml
L
)()1(ˆ)ˆ1(ˆ1)1)(1(ˆ)1(1 1121
2
??????????? ,                       (A.2)
in period-2. If the bank reveals its loan losses to the regulator, it earns
? ?)1)(1()1)(ˆ1)(ˆ1(,0 1 rERslMax m ?????? .                      (A.3)
Next we subtract (A.1) from (A.3) . The difference is at most
)1()ˆ1)(ˆ1( 1 Esl ???? .                      (A.4)
If this is negative, we know with certainty that hiding is profitable. This is true if
L   or S   is large enough (since 1ˆlL? , sS ˆ? ). In this model the profitability of hiding is based on
Assumption 5, which ensures that (A.4) is negative. Q.E.D.
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Appendix B
Appendix B shows the difference in expected returns in period-2, ? ?Roh 2Re2 ??? ?  , is larger than
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?? ?? .                      (B.1)
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2 ?  since the rolling over method is more profitable in period-2. We can rewrite (4.15) as
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The top line is positive if Ll ?Re2  and zero if Ll ?Re2 . It expresses expected returns when banking is
profitable under the refinance method in period-2, but the bank cannot achieve period-2 by rolling
over its defaulted loans due to illiquidity. The median line indicates returns when the bank is
profitable during period-2 under both methods. It is negative if Ll ?Re2  and zero if Ll ?Re2 . The
bottom line shows returns when banking is profitable under the rolling over method but
unprofitable under the refinance method. It is zero if Ll Ro ?2  or Ll ?Re2   and negative in other cases.
Note that ? ? )1()1()1)(1()1(1 21 rRElRlR mmm ?????????  can be rewritten as
? ?? ? mmm RrrElRlR )1()1()1()1)(1()1(1 21 ?????????? .                                            (B.3)
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When Rolll 22
Re
2
ˆ ?? the term is parenthesis is negative but (B.3) is positive. Thus, (B.3) is smaller
than mRr)1( ??  .
We will now show that (B.2) is non-positive but larger than (B.1). The proof consists
of four cases. First, suppose that Ll ?Re2 . Then Lll Ro ?? Re22  , the bottom line of (B.2) is zero and
(B.2) equals
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Now the term on the lower line is equal to (B.1), but the term on the upper line is positive. Hence,
(B.2) is larger than (B.1).  Suppose now LlL ?? Re2 .  Given (B.3), (B.2) is now larger than
? ? 221121 )()()()1()1()1)(1()1(1
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in which the lower line cannot be smaller than (B.1) and the upper line is positive. Hence, (B.5) and
(B.2) are larger than (B.1). Third, suppose that Ll ?Re2 . Now the top line and the median line of
(B.2) are zero and (B.2) simplifies to
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Given (B.3) this is larger than (B.1). Finally, when Ll Ro ?2  , then Lll Ro ?? Re22  and (B.2)  is zero.
Consequently, the difference in expected returns in period-2, ? ?Roh 2Re2 ??? ?  or (B.2) ,  is always
larger than (B.1). Q.E.D
Appendix C
This Appendix shows that when ? ? EREMin m ??,  , where mmm sRlRlR )1( 11 ???? , the bank
returns are lower under the rolling over method than under the refinance method even through the
interest receivables can be incorporated in the capital requirement. To begin, let ?  denote
0???? ERm? . Since ? ? EREMin m ??, , the bank can release E  units of initially injected
capital at the end of period-1. During period-2 the amount of capital is the sum of the initially
injected capital, E , and retained earnings, mmm sRlRlR )1( 11 ???? , from which the released capital,
E , is subtracted; that is, the amount of capital is ??E . Given the released capital, E , and the loan
interest income, mRsl )1)(1( 1 ??  , the funds of the bank total ERsl m ??? )1)(1( 1  or
)( mm RER ??? or ??mR  during period-1. The payments on deposits amount to rE)1( ? .
Appendix B has already explored the case where ?  is so large that the bank is illiquid
during period-1, ?? ?mR rE)1( ? . This is easy to see by reviewing Appendix B when ??? mR .
Thereafter, ?  is assumed to be so small that the bank is liquid during period-1;
?? ?mR rE)1( ? . When the life-time returns from the rolling over method are subtracted from the
life-time returns of the refinance method, we obtain
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The first term indicates returns during period-1 and the second term shows returns during period-2.
Note that since the bank is liquid at the end of period-1, (C.1) differs from (4.14). It is again
necessary to explore expected returns from period-2, ? ?Roh 2Re2 ??? ? , in detail. Recall the difference
from (B.2) when ,1 Ll ?   and Ss ?1   (the bank is never illiquid under the rolling over method)
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We will show that (C.2) is larger than
2211 )()()( dllfdssgdllfh
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which ensures that (C.1) is positive. From (C.2) it is easy to see that (C.2) is always larger than
(C.3) when Ll ?Re2  (recall (B.3)). It is enough to examine the case Ll ?Re2 . When Ll ?Re2 , (C.2) is
equal to (C.3) and thus (C.1) is zero. But when Ll ?Re2 , the bank always succeeds during period-2.
We will show that this cannot be possible, since the non-monitoring strategy can be profitable only
if the bank fails with a positive probability and thus benefits from limited liability. When Ll ?Re2
the banker’s expected returns under the rolling over method are
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where the terms in the big brackets and parenthesis are negative. Hence, banking can be profitable
(or yield zero returns) under the rolling over method only if Ll ?Re2 . But when Ll ?Re2  , (C.2)
exceeds (C.3) and thus (C.1) is positive. The refinance method is more profitable than the rolling
over method. Q.E.D
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